Patents are a useful but imperfect reward for innovation. In sectors like pharmaceuticals, where monopoly distortions seem particularly severe, there is growing international political pressure to identify alternatives to patents that could lower prices. Innovation prizes and other non-patent rewards are becoming more prevalent in government's innovation policy, and are also widely implemented by private philanthropists. In this paper we describe situations in which a patent buyout is effective, using information from market outcomes as a guide to the payment amount. We allow for the fact that sales may be manipulable by the innovator in search of the buyout payment, and show that in a wide variety of cases the optimal policy still involves some form of patent buyout. The buyout uses two key pieces of information: market outcomes observed during the patent's life, and the competitive outcome after the patent is bought out. We show that such dynamic market information can be effective at determining both marginal and total willingness to pay of consumers in many important cases, and therefore can generate the right innovation incentives.
Introduction
Innovation is the main engine of economic growth, and the consensus among economists, beginning with Arrow (1962) , is that the positive externalities from R&D imply under-investment relative to the socially optimal level. For example, a recent study by Bloom et al. (2013) estimates that the gross social rate of return to R&D substantially exceeds the private return, with the socially optimal R&D level being over twice as high as the currently observed R&D expenditure. A central policy question, therefore, is how one can best devise a mechanism that encourages innovation. This paper contributes to the recent literature focusing on designing prizes that infer demand from various market signals, and use that information to design a reward at least partially based on a cash prize. We show that, in a wide variety of environments, social welfare is best served with a hybrid system that incorporates market power but then o¤ers prizes in the form of a buyout of patent rights over time.
Mitigating patent rights as a way to improve welfare ts with current concern over the patent system. Concerns about the potentially deleterious e¤ects of patents have been voiced in both academic and policy debates. In a prominent book, Ja¤e and Lerner (2004) conclude that in the U.S. patents have become sand rather than lubricants in the wheels of American progress. Some have even gone so far as to recommend more draconian reductions in permissible patenting (Boldrin and Levine, 2008; Bessen and Maskin, 2009 ).
The buyout system replaces some of the rents that are obtained through monopoly rights with a prize. If the planner cannot discern the quality innovations, pure prizes are di¢cult to implement because the value of the prize cannot be tied to the surplus generated by the innovation as the demand is unknown by the policy maker. Even if the planner could get good information about the number of units sold at a given price, for instance by observing units sold under perfect competition, this is insu¢cient to construct the inframarginal values of consumers, which is essential to estimating the full value of an innovation. The hybrid mechanisms we consider can generate greater innovation incentives and increase social welfare if the policy maker has less than perfect information about market demand.
Our approach addresses the issue of needing to estimate inframarginal values. In order to accomplish this we stress the dynamic approach to innovation rewards, since one point on the demand curve will generally be insu¢cient for reconstructing demand. In contrast with the previous literature, we assume that the policy maker can learn over time about market conditions by observing price and quantity realizations that arise from the choice of the innovator and the underlying demand function. As information about the market demand is revealed, the reward mechanism that maximizes social welfare may change according to the revealed information. Eventually the policy-maker can resort to allowing perfect competition, which generates additional information about the demand for the innovation.
We consider the possibility that innovations may generate a variety of di¤erent demand curves, and that the market signals coming from the sales of those products may be manipulable by the innovator. In all but the least-manipulable environments we study, the optimal policy begins with market power for the innovator, and gradually moves toward competitive pricing as information is generated by the experience of the innovation. We show that even in the most manipulable environments, where the true price that gave rise to the observed sales can be completely obscured by the innovator, the optimal mechanism involves some reward through a contingent prize near the end of the period in which the innovator is rewarded. The optimal policy is a sort of hybrid between a patent and a prize in the sense that it rewards innovators through prices above marginal cost initially, but then moves toward a reward that is focused on a cash prize and prices closer to, or reaching, marginal cost.
The results are of interest both to the design of intellectual property policy and private philanthropic organizations who use resources to reward innovators through prizes. From the policy makers perspective, the di¢culty introduced by limited information about cost and demand conditions provides a foundation for why policy makers may wish to grant temporal monopoly rights (i.e. patents) to innovators. It has long been argued that rewards through monopoly prots (as guaranteed by patents) are tightly connected to the surplus generated by the product, and therefore provide the appropriate incentives for an innovator who knows the demand much better than the policy maker. This idea was originally formulated by Mill (1848) who wrote that patents are an e¤ective reward because the reward conferred by it depends upon the inventions being found useful, and the greater the usefulness, the greater the reward, and is at the heart of mechanism design approaches to patent policy like the one in Scotchmer (1999) .
In the sense that the optimal policies we study are a hybrid between a patent and a prize, this logic remains in e¤ect; the planner simply tries to mitigate the social cost of market power through buyouts in some cases. The buyout is facilitated by information from data in much the same way that the impact of a merger on consumer surplus is assessed through estimation of an econometric model.
Our results are also of particular interest for philanthropists who have entered the business of rewarding innovators. Qualcomm and Nokia currently o¤er multi-million dollar prizes for the development of a¤ordable devices that can recognize and measure personal health information. Similarly, the Gates Foundation has o¤ered an innovation award to immunize children in the poorest parts of the world. In recent academic and policy debates, it has been recommended to link prize rewards to specic market outcomes. For example, the Center for Global Development advised that philanthropists willing to sponsor the development of a malaria vaccine pay the innovator 14 dollar for each of the rst 200 million treatments sold at 1 dollar to the recipients (Glennerster, et al. 2006 ). 1 Our results suggest one approach to this philanthropy: use resources to buyout patents that have a track record of success.
We show the sense in which the details of this buyout approach are related to the philanthropists and policy makers concerns about the veracity of the market signals that are observed. In some cases, such as pharmaceuticals, quantity may be relatively well measured, but prices may be more opaque and companies have an incentive to manipulate their prices in order to obtain higher reimbursements through public funding. 2 One can alternatively view our model as describing some policy choices for a regulator, antitrust or otherwise, who faces rms with monopoly granted through IP. The FDA already is involved in the administration of ex post rights for pharmaceuticals through the orange book program and the rights granted therein. Similarly, the Australian government o¤ers 1 We develop a model with discrete time and innite horizon where the planner commits to a reward structure that depends on the history of prices and quantities realizations observed over time. The planners problem in designing an appropriate prize is observing total benet of the innovation. As in Kremer (1998) , this requires information about the quality of the innovation; Weyl and Tirole (2012) point out that this problem is magnied by the need to discern the willingness to pay of non-marginal consumers. Our mechanism attacks both issues.
Our rst result is that, in the absence of demand manipulation, the rst best can be approached arbitrarily closely in a large set of demand functions that includes those typically used in the industrial organization literature. We also show that the result generalizes to introducing noise in the demand and to allowing the demand to shift following a stochastic Markov process as in Battaglini (2005) . An implication of this result is that, in the absence of demand manipulation, innovation can be e¢ciently rewarded without patents. This is because information can be extracted from a competitive market in which the product is sold at marginal cost. The policy maker can generate price variation taxing the rms and shifting their marginal costs of production. This market outcome information can then be exploited by the policy maker to implement the rst best. Because the value of an innovation comes from both marginal and inframarginal consumers, monopoly power without price discrimination may deliver far less reward than the value of the innovation. In Kremer (1998) , this is addressed by paying a xed proportion above the monopoly value of the innovation. Here the planner directly addresses this issue by learning about inframarginal customers, and then can pay a reward that acts as if the monopolist had the opportunity to price discriminate.
Our ndings also indicate that policy-makers may design an innovation reward systems exploiting structural demand estimation techniques. Typically, structural demand studies identify the primitives of a model from local price variation and exploit the estimated parameters to conduct out-of-sample welfare analysis (Figure 1 case A) . In our contest, the policy-maker can request the innovator to generate price variation that will be used to identify the underlying demand curve of the technology and to compute a patent buy-out transfer that compensates the innovator for the surplus generated. By keeping the price variation concentrated around the marginal cost of production, the policy maker can limit the loss of surplus associated with learning to a minimum (Figure 1 
case B).
A B We then investigate the case in which the innovator can manipulate demand. In keeping with the pharmaceutical price manipulation example, we assume that quantity is observable, while price may not be. We show that it is crucial to distinguish between the case in which demand manipulation is possible after the buyout takes place and the case in which post-buyout demand is non-manipulable. We show that pre-buyout manipulation, even if costless, may be ignored as long as manipulation after buyout it is not possible. This is because the planner can generate price variation after the buyout to learn the demand and to punish the innovator in the case of manipulation. This implies that market outcomes are relevant even after the buyout, because they are useful to detect and avoid manipulations.
The case in which the planner cannot generate price variation after the buyout is more complicated. We consider the case in which after the buyout the patent is sold in a competitive market and neither the planner nor the innovator can manipulate this outcome. We show that in this case, as long as pre-buyout manipulation is costly, the planner can construct a buyout scheme that generates the same R&D incentives as a patent and increases total welfare.
Intuitively, the planner can induce the innovator to reveal the true monopoly prots by requiring a stream of pre-buyout outcomes that are too costly to manipulate.
Finally, we characterize the optimal mechanism when price manipulation is costless for the innovator. We show that even in this case the optimal mechanism di¤ers substantially from a patent. It is optimal for the planner to induce the innovator to produce quantities that are above the monopoly level and the output is larger for innovations generating lower surplus.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 presents the baseline model. Section 4 examines the optimal policy in the absence of demand manipulation. Section 5 introduces costly demand manipulation. Section 6 studies the optimal mechanism in the presence of costless demand manipulation. Section 7 summarizes and concludes. All the proofs are in Appendix 1.
Related Literature
This paper is connected to various strands of the literature on the economics of innovation.
In an inuential paper, Kremer (1998) suggests a buy-out mechanism linked to an auction to incentivize research and maximize welfare. The role of the auction is to reveal information to the planner about the private value generated by the innovation. Innovation incentives are maximized because the planner would pay for the patent the private value times a xed markup that compensates for the di¤erence between social and private surplus. Consumer welfare is also maximized because the innovation would be placed in the public domain once acquired by the planner. An important assumption underlying the buyout scheme suggested by Kremer is that the competitors of the innovator know the value (and the cost) of the innovation and are willing to take part to the auction. In our model, we depart from this assumption and assume that only the innovator knows how valuable an innovation is.
Wright ( competitors know the value of the innovation as in Kremer (1998) . Their main nding is that patents are necessary if the innovator can manipulate market signals. In our model we do not restrict the planner to use either patents or prizes and we consider a large set of reward structures that depend on the quantity and prices practiced by the innovator. Weyl and Tirole (2012) study the optimal reward structure in the presence of multidimensional heterogeneity and observable market outcomes. In a static framework, they show that the optimal policy requires some market power but not full monopoly prots. Such a policy is similar to Mitchell and Moro (2006), who study a planner who trades o¤ deadweight loss against over-transferring to a group that "loses" from elimination of the distortion generating deadweight loss. Our setup di¤ers from these models because we introduce dynamics and allow the innovator to manipulate market outcomes.
Scotchmer (1999) studies the optimal mechanism to reward innovation when the planner o¤ers a menu of patents that di¤er in length and application fee. She shows that if market outcomes are not observed, then in the presence of asymmetric information on the cost and benet of research, patent renewal mechanisms are optimal in the sense that every incentive compatible and individually rational direct revelation mechanism can be implemented with a renewal mechanism. Cornelli and Schankerman (1999) characterize the optimal innovation mechanism in a model with moral hazard and adverse selection when innovators have unobservable productivity parameters. As in Scotchmer (1999) , the planner o¤ers the innovator a menu of patents that di¤er in length and application fee. They show that the optimal patent scheme is typically di¤erentiated and can be implemented through menu of patent renewals. and private information about the quality of ideas and R&D investments. They show that in such environment the optimal mechanism is a patent buyout scheme where the innovator commits to a price ceiling at which he sell his rights to a future inventor.
The Model
Time is discrete and the horizon is innite. Each innovation is characterized by an ex-ante cost of creating the innovation, c 2 C 4 + , and a demand function q t = D (p t ; ) that is twice continuously di¤erentiable in the price variable. Let p > 0 be the minimum price at which D (p; ) = 0. We assume that 2 2; a compact subset of 4 N , and that D is continuous in . To ensure the concavity of the static prot function, we assume that D p (p; ) < 0 and
The known marginal cost of production is normalized to zero. Demand and cost parameters, and c are private information for the innovator and are distributed according to a smooth probability density function (; c) that is known by the planner.
We assume that the planner observes perfectly the quantities in each period but the innovator can manipulate the price observed by the planner. Specically, he can make the planner observe b p t by sustaining a cost (b p t ; p t ) with (p t ; p t ) = 0. Most of our analysis will focus on two polar cases: (i) no manipulation where
and (ii) costless manipulation where
Let us indicate with h t 2 H t the public history at time t, that can be dened recursively as h t = fh t01 ; r t g where r t = (q t ; b p t ) is the information revealed in period t and h 0 = . Thus H t 2 4 2t + ; the set of public histories at time t is the Cartesian product (t times) of the set of observable price quantity pairs.
The planner designs a reward schedule that in each period transfers to the innovator a sum, g t (h t ); that depends on the history h t 2 H t : The planner has also the option to set up a non-manipulable irreversible competitive market in period T + 1: The switching time may depend on the history, and can be innite (i.e. switching to competition may never occur).
A strategy of the innovator is a sequence of pair of prices (b p t ; p t ) for each period t that satises the constraint that prices are set to zero after switching has occurred. Formally, a strategy for the innovator is an innite sequence of price pairs ((b p t ; p t )) t=1;2;3;::: . Let B 2 A denote any such generic strategy and A denote the set of all possible strategies. 3 The function T (B) captures the time period in which the planners policy calls for a switch to the competitive and non-manipulable regime. This time is deterministic from the perspective of the innovator since it depends only on his strategy. In Appendix 2 we provide a recursive denition of T (B)
given the planners policy function.
Then the innovators maximization problem is
To simplify the notation, we leave the relationship between the switching time and the strategy of the innovator implicit and indicate T (B) as T in the remainder of the paper.
Let us indicate the optimal revealed and actual price for period t with b p 3 t () and p 3 t () and with h 3 t () the public history revealed by this optimal equilibrium play. Investment in innovation takes place if the net present value of the prots of the innovator (1) exceeds c. Let us indicate with 2 3 (c) the set of types for which this condition is satised.
The social surplus (net of manipulation costs) in the product market if the planner chooses functions fg t g t=1;2;3;::: and T is equal to:
The social planner chooses functions g t and T (taking the optimal strategy of the innovator as given) to maximize the expected total social welfare created by the innovation:
The rst best can now be dened formally: in the rst best it holds that p t = 0 for all t 1, the innovator does not distort the observed price (b p t = p t ), and the innovation is developed if and only if
The rst best can be easily implemented by the planner if is known. To do so, the planner transfers the entire surplus to the innovator if he observes the competitive quantity and punishes the innovator if a di¤erent quantity is observed (i.e. g t = S(0; ) if q t = D (0; ) and g t = 01
The functions g t and T allow the planner to implement a number of di¤erent reward mechanisms. We provide some examples below.
Patents
When g t (h t ) = 0 and T = & the planner o¤ers a &-period patents that generates innovation incentives through product market prots. The setting also accommodates the payment of renewal fees. For example we can introduce a fee, f , to be paid at time T 1 < &, with expiration of the patent in the absence of payment:
Buyouts
The following specication
captures a simple buy-out scheme in which the planner commits to buy the patent after & periods at a pre-specied amount K. The setting also allows to implement more general buyout mechanisms where transfer price K and acquisition time T may depend on observed market outcomes.
Optimal Mechanism in the Absence of Demand Manipulation
In this section we characterize the optimal mechanism when the government can dictate prices and the innovator cannot manipulate demand, i.e.
To develop the intuition, let us consider a simple setting where the demand is linear q t = 1 0 2 p t . In this simple environment the planner can identify the intercept of the demand by inducing a price equal to zero in the rst period so that q 1 = 1 . In the second period he can induce p 2 = " > 0 and identify 2 by inverting q 2 = q 1 0 2 ". This means that it takes only two periods for the planner to learn the demand function and the surplus generated by the innovation. Notice that the planner can set " arbitrarily close to zero and minimize the deadweight loss generated by above marginal cost pricing. If the entire surplus generated by the innovation is transferred to the innovator, innovation incentives are set at the rst best level. 4 The above example suggests that transfers that depend on market outcomes can be powerful mechanisms to incentivize innovation. The planner nds it optimal to use market information in a truly dynamic way that allows him to approximate the complete information (rst best) solution. In particular, by conditioning rewards on quantities and prices, the planner can obtain the information required to trace-out the demand curve. Once the demand is known, the surplus generated by the innovation is transferred to the inventor to maximize his innovation incentives. In the linear case, the demand can be learned by observing only two data points: the quantity sold at marginal cost and the quantity sold at any strictly positive price. Exploiting this feature of the demand, the planner will learn the demand by inducing the innovator to sell at an arbitrarily small price. This makes the deadweight loss negligible and allows the planner to approximate the rst best solution.
The result obtained in the simple linear setting suggests that in a dynamic environment the planner can substantially improve welfare and innovation incentives relative to patent systems or other static multidimensional screening mechanisms as the one characterized by Weyl and Tirole (2012) . We now turn to the question of how general the result is. We start with the denition of an analytic demand function.
Denition 1 (Judd, 1998) A demand function D( : ; ) is analytic on X if and only if for every p 2 X there is an r; and a sequence c k such that whenever jz 0 pj < r :
We generalize the result obtained for linear demands to analytic functions. 
Implementation
The above result suggests that variation in prices and quantities may provide useful information for a planner who aims to maximize welfare by providing innovation incentives and minimizing distortions in the product market. For a large class of demand functions, we have shown that a policy maker can learn the surplus generated by the innovation and minimize market distortions by generating a price variation that is close to the marginal cost of production. This allows the planner to implement an outcome arbitrarily close to the rst best.
The most intuitive way to generate this price variation is by awarding the innovator a patent that confers him the exclusive right to sell the product and to commit to a patent buyout scheme whose reward depends on the observed market outcomes. In other words, the planner can dictate to the patentee a price path and commit to buy-out the patent if the innovator follows the path with a reward that depends on the quantities sold. The computation of the reward resembles structural estimation studies which typically estimate the primitives of a model from local price variation and exploit these estimates for out-of-sample welfare analysis.
An implication of our result is that policy-makers may a¤ect innovation incentives by designing reward systems that exploit these techniques.
In the context of the malaria vaccine, the Center for Global Development proposes to reward the innovator with a prize if 200 million treatments are sold at 1 dollar to the recipients.
The suggested prize is 2.8 billion (14 dollars per treatment). A possible concern with such scheme is that vaccine development may ine¢ciently not take place if such reward is too small compared to the social welfare generated by the vaccine. An implication of Proposition 1 is that this prize scheme can be improved by requesting the successful innovator to sell the 200 million treatments at di¤erent prices, even if the overall price level remains close to the 1 dollar benchmark. This is because the market outcomes generated by such price variation will allow the sponsor to obtain an estimate of the product market-surplus generated by the new vaccine. Such estimate will provide useful guidance in determining the reward and avoiding under-payment (or overpayment) for the innovation.
But buyouts are not the only way to implement the rst best. An alternative approach is to start from a perfectly competitive market in which the product is sold at marginal cost.
The price variation can then be generated by the planner taxing the rms and shifting their marginal costs of production. The information generated in this way will be the same as the one generated by the buyout scheme and can be exploited by the planner to implement the rst best. An implication of this alternative implementation method is that market power is not essential to solve the asymmetric information problem between the policy maker and the innovator. In other words, for a large class of demand functions the socially optimal innovation level can be reached through minor perturbations of a competitive market.
Extensions and discussion
In Appendix 2 we describe a number of extensions of our baseline model. Then he will set p = " until two di¤erent quantities are observed. With two observations along each demand line the planner learns the demand and welfare functions. By setting " arbitrarily close to zero, the dead weight loss generated by above marginal cost pricing is minimized and the rst best is approached arbitrarily closely. An interesting feature of this result is that the optimal incentive scheme is non-stationary and has unbounded memory even if the demand shifts follow a Markov process and the relevant economic environment has a memory of only one period.
Second, we consider the case in which the demand is observed with error and assume that q t = D(p t ; ) + " t where " t is a mean zero i.i.d. noise over the support [0"; "]. Even in this case, analyticity of the demand function is su¢cient to approach the rst best arbitrarily closely. In the linear demand case, the planner can use the following two step scheme. In the rst stage the planner induces the rm to charge p = 0 and obtains a sample of N quantities for this price. Then he sets a price equal to " and obtains another sample of N quantities. The weak law of large numbers guarantees that, for N large enough, the sample averages are unbiased estimates of D(0; ) and D("; ) and therefore the demand parameters can be learned by the planner. While the law of large numbers guarantees that the estimate is unbiased, the variance of the estimate depends on the price variation and is smaller when the variation is larger. This is not an issue in our setting because we assumed that the planner and the innovator are risk neutral. Even in the case of risk aversion, the variance can be made arbitrarily small by letting the sample size, N , be very large. 5 We then describe an environment in which Proposition 1 may not generalize that is the case in which demand grows over time. In such setting, when the demand does not grow too quickly, the planner will be able to approximate each level of demand and approach the rst best. Nevertheless, the planner may not have enough time to learn the various demand levels when growth is fast and the rst best may not be approached.
It is important to notice that, in general, Proposition 1 does not hold in settings where structural demand identication is not feasible. When the demand is not analytic, local price variation cannot be exploited to identify to estimate the global behavior of the demand function.
In the same way, when demand grows very fast it may be unfeasible to collect the price quantity observations necessary to identify demand. These issues are typical in structural modeling,
where it is assumed that the structural parameters identied through local data variation can be used to perform counterfactuals or policy simulations (Reiss and Wolak, 2007) . From this perspective, Proposition 1 does not require extra assumptions to those typically imposed in structural industrial organization studies.
Demand Manipulation
The analysis in Section 4 focused on the case of no demand manipulation. In this Section we consider the case in which the innovator can manipulate the market outcomes.
Buyouts and Price Variation
In the general model described in Section 3, the innovator can a¤ect the market outcomes and manipulate market signals received by the planner up to period T but not after T . Our model also assumes a constant competitive market outcome from T + 1. A natural interpretation of this assumption is that the patent is acquired by the planner at T , so in the following we will refer to T as the buyout time. 6 For a moment, let us depart from that model and assume that the planner (but not the innovator) can a¤ect market outcomes after T . In this setting the rst best can be approximated as in the case in which manipulation is not possible. This is the case both if manipulation is costly and if it is costless. To see this, consider the case in which the demand is linear.
Then the planner can acquire the patent in the rst period, sell the innovation at p 1 = "
and p 2 = 0 and reward the innovator in the second period. In other words, the planner can appropriate the patent, generate the market outcomes required to learn the surplus generated by the innovation and then compensate the innovator. Alternatively, the planner can induce the innovator to generate the market outcomes necessary to learn the surplus and use additional post-buyout market outcomes to detect demand manipulations. For example, the patentee can be required to sell at p 1 = " and p 2 = 0 in the rst two periods. The planner can then acquire the patent and practice p 3 = " and p 4 = 0 in the third and fourth periods. If the outcomes generated by the innovator coincide with those generated by the planner, the innovator will be rewarded with a transfer that approximates the surplus generated. If there are di¤erences between market outcomes generated by the innovator and those generated by the planner, the innovator receives no transfer.
The basic insight is that pre-buyout manipulation, even if costless, can be avoided as long as manipulation after buyout is not possible and the planner can generate price variation after buyout to identify the demand and detect manipulation. Therefore, for manipulation to distort away from the rst best, it has to be the case that either (i) manipulation by the innovator is feasible both before and after the buyout or (ii) the ability of the planner to generate price variation after the buyout is limited. In the next Section we study case (ii) from above.
Post-Buyout Competitive Outcome
We now consider the case in which after the buyout time T the innovation is sold in a competitive market and that neither the innovator nor the planner can a¤ect (manipulate) this outcome. The quantity of product sold can be perfectly observed by the planner but the price and hence the revenue can be distorted by the innovator, as described in Section 3. This may arise, for example, when the innovator awards secret discounts to his consumers.
To provide a micro-foundation of the manipulation cost (b p t ; p t ) we assume that the Proposition 2 A patent of length T is Pareto dominated by a patent buyout scheme that depends on market outcomes.
The proposition shows that for any patent of length T the policy maker can design a buyout scheme that generates greater welfare than the patent. The planner commits to buy out the patent at a price that depends on the market outcomes observed during the rst b T < T periods. The buyout time b T is chosen to allow the planner to learn about the value of the innovation and to remove the incentives of the innovator to manipulate sales. At this optimal time the marginal cost of manipulating sales for b T periods is equal to the marginal benet of obtaining extra buyout reward.
In the linear case the optimal buyout time b T is pinned down by the formula
that indicates how patent buyout takes place sooner as i gets larger. This result is reminiscent of Chari et al (2012) who consider patents and prizes, and show that shorter patents are more likely to be optimal when manipulation costs are higher, but longer patents need to be used when manipulation costs are lower. In the next Section, we show that even with costless manipulation of the price signals (when an innitely lived patent is implied by (2)), one can do better by considering mechanisms that are di¤erent from both prizes and patents. 8 With additional assumptions on the relationship between surplus and monopoly prots, innovation incentives can be increased even more. Take for example the setting of Weyl and
Tirole (2012) with D(p; ) = Q( p m ) where = (; m), m is the monopoly price, is the quantity sold at marginal cost price and Q() is a function known to the planner. In their setting there is proportionality between monopoly prots mQ(1) and surplus at zero price mS(0). By inducing truthful revelation of monopoly prots, the buyout allows the planner to back out the surplus and to transfer the entire surplus to the innovator from period b T + 1.
The innovator will obtain the monopoly prots before the buyout and the entire consumer surplus for the post-buyout period. In this way consumers enjoy greater surplus than the case of a T -period patent and the innovator has greater innovation incentives. In particular, the outcome resembles the rst best after the buyout, because there is marginal cost pricing and all the surplus is transferred to the innovator. 9 One may speculate that when b (b p; p) = 0 patents cannot be improved upon. This is not the case, as the next proposition shows. 10 Proposition 3 When b (b p; p) = 0 there is a per unit subsidy level that Pareto dominates patents that last forever. 8 It is important to note that there are two important di¤erences between the setup of Chari et al (2012) and ours. First, we allow heterogeneous innovation costs. Second, Chari et al (2012) rule out positive transfers by allowing the innovator to produce a fake (and useless) "innovation". 9 In the linear specication, if we interpret i > 0 as the di¤erence between the cost of external and internal nancing the planner can reduce manipulation incentives even more by combining the buyout of the patent with the requirement to purchase a bond. Specically, the planner can request the innovator to purchase a bond that costs D > pD(p; ), pays no interest and expires after T * periods. If pD(p; ) is the only revenue available to the innovator, he will have to borrow D > pD(p; ) 0 pD(p; ) for T * periods at a cost of
This extra manipulation cost generated by the bond allows to accelerate the buyout time and therefore increases consumer welfare.
Proposition 3 shows that even when price manipulation is costless, the planner can improve upon patents by exploiting the observed quantities. In the proof we show that a small quantity subsidy increases product market surplus by reducing the market price and increasing rms prots. We also show that for small enough, such positive welfare e¤ect dominates any loss generated by entry of ine¢cient innovators induced by the subsidy.
Overall, Propositions 2 and 3 show that for a broad class of demand functions patents are not the optimal mechanism to incentivize innovation when the planner can observe market outcomes, even when the innovator may substantially manipulate sales. In the next Section, in a simplied environment, we characterize the optimal mechanism.
Optimal Mechanism with Costless Manipulation
In this Section we study the optimal incentive system in which the quantity produced is observable by the planner, but the innovator can manipulate the price costlessly, so the price will not be contracted on. This assumption captures a situation where the innovator can o¤er secret price discounts to buyers at no cost (other than lowering revenues). As in the previous Section, we assume that after the buyout the innovation is sold in a competitive market and that neither the innovator nor the planner can a¤ect (manipulate) this outcome.
We will study the problem with a mechanism design approach in which the innovator reports to the planner a type, b ; and the planner requires that in period t the innovator produces a specic quantity, q t ( b ), and receives a payment t ( b ). To simplify the analysis we focus on the linear demand case D(p) = 1 0 2 p.
First, we show that there is no loss of generality in assuming that the planner knows the intercept 1 . 11 More precisely, we can approximate the welfare of an auxiliary problem where the planner knows 1 from the outset arbitrarily closely. This is an upper bound because the planner cannot do better than in the hypothetical case where he observed 1 at the beginning.
Lemma 1
The planner can approximate the welfare that can be induced under full information about 1 arbitrarily close.
This result is quite intuitive: the planner can perfectly learn the demand intercept when the market becomes perfectly competitive and punish the innovator if 1 was not reported truthfully. Exploiting this Lemma, we focus on the linear demand case with known intercept (normalized to 1) and unknown slope that for simplicity we rewrite as 2 = 1=2. The demand is therefore
and larger are associated with steeper demand curves and larger consumer surplus. Notice that the monopoly quantity is independent of and it is equal to q M = 1=2:
Static Mechanisms
We rst study a static setting where the prots are realized only for one period after the innovator reports his type. Let p( b ; ) = 2(1 0 q( b )) be the price at which the innovator can sell quantity q( b ) if the actual demand is characterized by . The prots from reporting b when the type is (gross of innovation costs) are:
Letting V () = U (; ) 0 c denote the rent under truth-telling, the envelope theorem implies that
The above condition (3) is a rst order condition. The following result states a necessary and su¢cient condition for implementability:
Lemma 2 A schedule q() can be implemented if and only if q is weakly decreasing in .
Lemma 2 shows that the optimal mechanism requires the quantity sold to be decreasing in . Therefore, as the surplus created by the innovation increases, the quantity produced is reduced. The intuition for this result is the following. The planner exploits market power to induce truthful revelation and screen consumers willingness to pay. When is large consumers are willing to pay high prices for the product and the innovator is likely to prefer market power to lump-sum transfers. Conversely, when is low consumers are price sensitive and market power would not be attractive to the innovator.
We are ready to formulate the planners problem. First, note that the total surplus when q is implemented for an innovator with type is W (q; ) = R q 0 2(1 0 x)dx = (2q 0 q 2 ). Let b c() be the highest cost innovator who enters (endogenously determined by the mechanism by V () = 0). Then the objective function can be written as
The planners problem is
The main challenges are twofold: rst, the monotonicity constraint on q; second, the fact that the state variable b c() has free initial and end conditions, a combination that is uncommon for standard dynamic optimization problems. To obtain a solution to this problem, let us assume uniform independent distributions for c and on [0; 1] and [; 1] for some > 0:
Then the problem simplies to (ignoring a few constants):
Optimal static mechanism
In the next proposition we characterize the optimal quantity schedule in the presence of costless price manipulation.
Proposition 4
In the optimal static mechanism, there exists 2 (; 1) such that it holds that q is strictly decreasing on interval [; ] and then constant on [; 1]. Moreover, q() 2=3 > 1=2 = q monopoly for all and q() = 1 = q f irst best .
To gain intuition for this result, our starting point is Lemma 2, which implies that the quantity schedule needs to be weakly decreasing to be incentive compatible. In the proof of the Proposition, we show that in the relaxed problem where the monotonicity constraint on q is ignored, the optimal solution is such that q() = q(1) = 1. 12 Given this, it is not surprising that when one reintroduces the monotonicity constraint on q it is still true that q() = 1. It is also not surprising that now q(1) < 1, because q(1) = 1 and the monotonicity constraint would imply that q() = 1 for all , that is all possibility for screening would be given up.
Proposition 4 shows that the optimal mechanism di¤ers substantially from a patent system even if the innovator can manipulate price signals costlessly. The optimal quantity schedule has three important characteristics. First, the quantity produced varies across types.
This is a fundamental di¤erence with the patent system that implements only the monopoly quantity that in our setting is constant across types. Second, the quantity produced by each type is above the monopoly quantity. Thus, despite costless price manipulation, information on the quantity produced allows the planner to reward the innovation generating less distortions than a traditional patent system. Finally, the optimal quantity is strictly decreasing in for low values of and constant for high surplus innovations as depicted in Figure 2 . The intuition behind this result is that the planners welfare maximization involves a trade-o¤ between a consumer welfare e¤ect and a screening e¤ect. When quantities decrease with , the planner can use market power to screen consumers willingness to pay. Nevertheless, maximization of consumer surplus implies that larger quantities should be o¤ered for innovation with larger since the impact on welfare of an increase in q is greater the greater is . For low values of , the screening e¤ect dominates and the planner exploits market power to screen willingness to pay. This is intuitive since for low it is crucial for the planner to avoid excess entry of low value innovators. As increases, the innovations have larger impact on consumer surplus and the planner has lower incentives to distort the market for screening purposes.
For large enough, the consumer welfare e¤ect dominates and the planner implements a quantity schedule that is constant in . The idea that market power can be exploited to screen willingness to pay is similar to the logic in Weyl and Tirole (2012). 13 
Optimal Dynamic Mechanism and Discussion
Having characterized the optimal quantity schedule in the static setting, we now consider the dynamic problem where the planner can choose a path (q t (); t ()) for every t 0. 14 Our main result shows that repeating the same quantity over time for all types is optimal.
Proposition 5 It is optimal for the planner to set a policy where q t () is constant in time for any , that is to adopt the optimal static mechanism.
A constant mechanism (over time) is optimal because of the desirable features of quantity (and price) smoothing over time. This is due to the fact that the total surplus is concave in the quantity (and price), so inducing a temporal variation in quantities (as patents do) introduces extra distortion in the product market without improving innovation incentives. This nding resembles the result of Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) . 15 Proposition 5 conrms that the optimal mechanism di¤ers from a patent system even if manipulation (of prices) is costless. Welfare is maximized with the innovator selling a quantity that is above the monopolistic quantity until the buyout occurs, unlike the (optimal) patent system described by Scotchmer (1995) . This result is related to our earlier nding (Proposition 3), which shows that a small quantity subsidy always improves welfare.
Notice the apparent tension between Proposition 5 and Lemma 1. Proposition 5 requires the planner to implement a constant quantity over time whereas Lemma 1 requires the planner to move to the competitive outcome for at least one period in order to learn the intercept of the demand function. This tension identies a key trade-o¤. On one hand, the planner would like to smooth market outcomes over time to increase welfare. On the other hand, the planner would like to generate variation of market outcomes to learn the underlying demand parameters. In the linear context, this tension leads to a mechanism that resembles a buyout where the patent is bought out after a long time (as long as possible) has elapsed. 16 Proposition 5 also highlights the fact that learning from market signals over time may be substituted by an initial screening process where the innovator self reports his type. The literature on dynamic mechanism design cautions us that this result (no learning is optimal until the buyout) is only true because our agent (the innovator) has strictly superior information over the planner, and this advantage is maintained over time. However, in a large number of applications this may be a realistic assumption. In such applications, the optimal mechanism does not utilize learning on the part of planner, rather it relies on a single report of the innovator at the outset. Such a policy can be implemented by o¤ering a menu of R&D subsidies and per unit quantity subsidies.
It is beyond the scope of our work to characterize the optimal mechanism in a general framework of dynamic market signals, but a few characteristics of our proposed mechanism appear to be robust. First, prices need not be set at the extremes of monopoly pricing (i.e. full patent protection) or fully competitive pricing. Second, buyout itself can be viewed in terms of as an increase in patent breadth because a lower quantity reduces consumer surplus and increases the prots of the innovator.
of its ability to generate information, an important aspect that has been overlooked by the previous literature. Relatedly, observed demand information after the patent buyout can be used to incentivize innovation.
Conclusions
In this paper we have examined the problem of a social planner aiming to maximize consumer welfare and innovation incentives while observing prices and quantities practiced by the innovator over time. We have shown that information about market outcomes may allow the planner to generate more welfare than a traditional patent system through patent buyouts.
There are a number of historical experiences in which governments bought patents out.
The most famous example of patent buyout took place in July 1839 when the French government purchased the patent for the Daguerreotype photography process. The inventor, Luis Jacques Daguerre, was not able to nd buyers for the process, but obtained the support of a politician that convinced the government to acquire the patent and put the rights in the public domain. Within a short period of time the process spread around the country to become the technology standard in photography (Kremer, 2001 ). In recent academic and policy debates pharmaceutical patent buyouts have been suggested as a strategy to improve health in low income countries. For example, Banerjee et al. (2010) propose that a Health Impact Fund compensate drug manufacturers that sell in low income countries at marginal cost. They suggest that the compensation to a given manufacturer would depend on use of the drug and evidence of realized health benets. 17 Our paper provides two main insights into the design and application of such buyout schemes. First, the planner may nd it benecial to collect market data before the buyout and use them to estimate the surplus generated by the innovation. In practice, surplus may be estimated through structural econometric models that allow policy makers to estimate the primitives of consumer preferences and to generate out of sample predictions (Cho and Rust, 2008) . Such estimates can provide useful guidance in the determination the buyout compensation for the innovator. Second, the planner should consider the welfare cost associated with collecting price-quantity observations. As long as local variation in market outcomes can be exploited to learn about the global properties of the demand, prices close to marginal costs minimize the loss in consumer surplus.
